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Abstract
The philosophy of grief has directed little attention to bereavement’s impact on 
perceptual experience. However, misperceptions, hallucinations and other anom-
alous experiences are strikingly common following the death of a loved one. 
Such experiences range from misperceiving a stranger to be the deceased, to 
phantom sights, sounds and smells, to nebulous quasi-sensory experiences of the 
loved one’s presence. This paper draws upon the enactive sensorimotor theory 
of perception to offer a phenomenologically sensitive and empirically informed 
account of these experiences. It argues that they can be understood as deriv-
ing from disruption to both sensorimotor expectations and perceived opportuni-
ties for action, stemming from the upheaval of bereavement. Different facets of 
the enactive sensorimotor approach can help to explain different types of post-
bereavement perceptual experience. Post-bereavement misperceptions can be 
accounted for through the way that alterations to sensorimotor expectations can 
result in atypical ‘amodal completion’, while bereavement hallucinations can be 
understood as ‘appearances’ that fail to form part of the usual patterns of senso-
rimotor contingency. Quasi-sensory experiences of the presence of the deceased 
can be understood as resulting from changes to perceived affordances. This 
paper aims to demonstrate the explanatory value of key aspects of the sensori-
motor approach by highlighting how they can help to explain the phenomenol-
ogy of post-bereavement experiences. However, it also illuminates certain areas 
in which the sensorimotor approach ought to be supplemented, especially if it is 
to account for tight connections between perception, affect, and intersubjectivity 
that are salient in grief.
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Grief involves profound emotional upheaval, but it also has wide-reaching impli-
cations for other aspects of human experience, many of which have received 
comparatively little philosophical attention. In particular, misperceptions, hal-
lucinations and other anomalous perceptual experiences are strikingly common 
following a bereavement. This paper offers an account of these non-veridical and 
unusual post-bereavement experiences. Drawing upon the enactive sensorimotor 
theory of perception, I propose that many such experiences result from disrup-
tion to sensorimotor expectations and perceived opportunities for action. When 
a loved one dies, one’s implicit expectations related to the loved one’s presence 
are violated, and the sensory implications of one’s own worldly engagement are 
thus likewise altered. The suggested approach offers an account of non-verid-
ical experiences that often occur during grief that is accurate regarding their 
phenomenology and informed by empirical research surrounding both grief and 
perception.
The sensorimotor theory of perception (e.g., Hurley, 1998; O’Regan & Noë, 
2001; Noë, 2004) has offered a promising account of perceptual experience, 
helping to explain and generate predictions with regards wide-ranging and puz-
zling perceptual phenomena. The approach tells us that the phenomenal charac-
ter of perceptual experiences is explained by the perceiver’s implicit, practical 
expectations regarding sensorimotor contingencies – law-like relations between 
motor action and sensory changes. For example, we perceive a largely stable, 
coherent world before us despite dramatic and continuous shifts in visual stim-
ulation as our eyes saccade. This ability to perceive coherent, invariant objects 
and scenes is taken to be (at least partly) due to expectations regarding the sen-
sory implications of one’s own body movements. A perceiver’s ability to flu-
ently engage with the world is said to be laden with these implicit expectations. 
In recent years, researchers have extended such an approach to other domains, 
such as social engagement and empathy (Chemero, 2016) and atypical experi-
ences like post-traumatic stress disorder (Ataria, 2015) and psychopathology 
more generally (Myin et  al., 2015). This paper argues that the approach also 
enables us to better understand perceptual facets of grief1 through considera-
tion of how bereavement involves disruption to relevant patterns of sensorimo-
tor contingency.
1 This paper will not address in any detail the issue of whether the perceptual experiences that can occur 
in reaction to bereavement should truly be understand as part of grief, or whether they are better under-
stand as a reaction to, or frequent accompaniment to, grief, and the argument presented doesn’t hinge 
upon a particular answer to this question. However, it is worth noting that grief is often said not to be a 
mental state or event, but rather a complex process composed of heterogenous ingredients (e.g., Goldie, 
2011), and there seems little reason to automatically exclude perceptual experiences from grief’s com-
plex pattern. Moreover, other researchers argue that grief is characterised by a tension between experi-
ences of presence, experiences of absence, and experiences of presence in absence (e.g., Fuchs, 2018, p. 
51 describes this as grief’s ‘core conflict’), which is suggestive of grief having an important perceptual 
dimension.
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Regardless of whether one endorses the sensorimotor approach wholesale, as 
we shall see, key concepts and strategies drawn from the approach can eluci-
date the kinds of perceptual experiences that occur amid the disruption to one’s 
world caused by a bereavement. This paper’s purpose is therefore not to defend 
sensorimotor enactivism, and its arguments are likely compatible with differ-
ent but complementary approaches that also emphasise the role of expectations 
regarding the sensory upshots of motor action.2 Rather, the paper’s aim is to 
demonstrate the explanatory potential of such an approach, particularly with 
regards its accounts of sensorimotor expectations, affordances, and the problem 
of ‘perceptual presence’ – our ability to perceive whole objects despite the limi-
tations of our sensory contact with the world. These aspects of the sensorimotor 
approach can, I argue, allow for an empirically informed and phenomenologi-
cally sensitive account of key types of anomalous post-bereavement perceptual 
phenomena. Although the focus here is bereavement experiences, the approach 
may also have wider applicability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section  2 introduces a rough taxonomy of 
non-veridical experiences that often follow bereavement. Section 3 discusses the 
role of sensorimotor expectations in perceptual experience and how sensorimo-
tor disruption can impact perceptual phenomenology. I argue that sensorimotor 
expectations are contravened in important ways by the absence of a loved one. 
Section 4 sets out how the sensorimotor approach can offer an account of post-
bereavement non-veridical experiences that accurately captures the associated 
phenomenology. First, our violated expectations can allow for atypical instances 
of ‘amodal completion’, accounting for misperceptions common in bereavement. 
Second, the approach allows for non-veridical ‘appearances’, which are not suc-
cessfully integrated into our understanding of sensorimotor contingencies. This 
helps to account for hallucinatory bereavement experiences and explains why 
such experiences frequently lack the ‘perceptual presence’ characteristic of 
objective perception of the world. Third, bereavement disrupts the opportuni-
ties for action that one perceives, helping to account for nebulous quasi-sensory 
experiences of presence. Section  5 highlights certain limitations of the senso-
rimotor approach in accounting for post-bereavement experiences and suggests 
some avenues for supplementing the approach. Section 6 discusses some further 
implications of the approach set out in this paper.
2 For example, similar claims could be made through the lens of autopoietic enactivism (Varela, Thomp-
son, & Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007). This paper draws upon the sensorimotor variant of enactivism 
due to its specific focus on sensorimotor expectations and sensorimotor disruption and will not discuss 
the potential overlap and differences between these approaches. Various authors have also taken the sen-
sorimotor approach to be compatible with the increasingly influential predictive processing framework, 
which offers a plausible story about the mechanistic underpinnings of our sensorimotor expectations 
(see, e.g., Seth, 2014; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019). According to such an approach, our sensorimotor 
expectations are implemented through counterfactually rich generative models, whereby the brain gener-
ates predictions not only with regards the sensory states that will occur but also those that would counter-
factually occur on the basis of possible actions (Seth, 2014).
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2  Taxonomising non‑veridical bereavement experiences
Non-veridical perceptual experiences often occur after bereavement. Studies report 
that between 30 and 60% of bereaved spouses have experienced so called ‘post-
bereavement hallucinations’ (e.g., Rees, 1971, 1975; Castelnovo et al., 2015).3 These 
experiences may not be maladaptive, with many reporting them to be comforting 
(Parkes, 1970), and some researchers take such experiences to be normal expres-
sions of our ‘continuing bonds’ with the deceased (e.g., Klass et al., 1996; Steffen 
& Coyle, 2011). Despite the strikingly high percentage of people who undergo these 
experiences, these phenomena remain poorly understood. In particular, the nature of 
what have been termed ‘post-bereavement hallucinations’ appear to be heterogene-
ous, but this is often obscured by researchers failing to distinguish them, using terms 
like ‘hallucinations’, ‘illusions’ and ‘experiences of presence’ interchangeably, or 
using different terminology to describe the same phenomena. For example, some 
studies use the term ‘illusion’ to refer to non- or quasi- sensory experiences of pres-
ence, but do not distinguish hallucinations and misperceptions (e.g., Rees, 1971). 
Thus, I shall begin by offering a rough taxonomy of post-bereavement experiences.
Non-veridical post-bereavement experiences fall into three main categories: mis-
perceptions, sensory hallucinations, and quasi-sensory experiences of presence. 
First, cases of misperception (or illusion) following a bereavement are very com-
mon (Clayton, 2000; Parkes & Prigerson, 2010, pp. 58–59; Castelnovo et al., 2015). 
It is likely that many experiences that have been termed bereavement ‘hallucina-
tions’ in fact fall into this category. Existing sights, sounds and smells are misper-
ceived as being related to the deceased. One may misperceive a stranger in a crowd 
as the deceased or misinterpret a creak on the stairs as being their footsteps (Parkes, 
1970; Clayton, 2000).4 Where one misperceives a person or object as being associ-
ated with the deceased, the experience is often transient, being quickly rectified by 
closer attention to the object in question. Such cases are generally taken to result 
from the bereaved having a ‘perceptual set’ (i.e., perceptual expectations or biases) 
for the deceased (Parkes, 1970; Parkes & Prigerson, 2010). As we shall see in 4.1, 
the sensorimotor approach can concur with the emphasis on perceptual expectations 
here, and offer further clarification of the manner in which expectations allow for 
such misperceptions.
4 Certain cases, such as misperceiving a creak, might raise questions about whether one’s perceptual 
experiences have gone awry or whether it is only one’s post-perceptual judgments that have gone wrong. 
In Sect. 3.1 I shall say a little more about why, with a sensorimotor approach, one is likely to construe 
this as a perceptual phenomenon.
3 The vast majority of the research into non-veridical bereavement experiences has focused upon spousal 
bereavement. Therefore, the extent to which other forms of bereavement are likely to trigger such expe-
riences is unclear. With the approach to be set out in this paper, we should expect such experiences to 
be especially common in cases where one’s life is closely entwined with that of the person who died, 
since in such cases one is likely to have a greater suite of expectations regarding the presence of the 
deceased. However, it is plausible that in other cases, one will still have a more limited set of expecta-
tions regarding the presence of the deceased, which could manifest in terms of non-veridical experiences 
in more constrained circumstances. For example, one might have powerful expectations about seeing 
their deceased grandma when visiting her former home.
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Secondly, full-blown hallucinations are cases where one has an experience as 
of some worldly object, but which is not a genuine perception of anything in the 
subject’s environment. This is distinguished from illusions or misperceptions: cases 
where an object is perceived, but perceptually appears to have properties it does 
not have. It is unclear how prevalent full-blown hallucinations are in the context of 
bereavement, but some describe post-bereavement experiences that are not easily 
understood as misperceptions. For example, Parkes (1970, p. 194) discusses subjects 
seeing their deceased loved ones in ways that ‘were clearly unrelated to pre-existing 
sensory stimuli’. One reported seeing her deceased husband gardening while wear-
ing only his trousers, and another reported seeing her father standing beside her 
bed at night.5 Although such cases may not always be clearly distinguishable from 
misperceptions and other experiences such as dreams, the sensorimotor approach 
can accommodate the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that differ from both 
and offers an explanation of the phenomenal character of these experiences (see 
Sect. 4.2).
Finally, the most commonly reported non-veridical post-bereavement experience 
is the quasi-sensory feeling of the ‘presence’ of the deceased (Grimby, 1993; Castel-
novo et  al., 2015; see Ratcliffe, 2020b for a detailed phenomenological account 
of such experiences), which are generally not taken to involve any specific sen-
sory modality. Steffen and Coyle (2011 p. 589) characterise the experience as one 
where, ‘There is a sense that the deceased loved one is temporarily present in an 
almost physical form, perceived partly through near-sensory awareness and partly 
through an […] intuitive knowing.’ These experiences often involve the feeling that 
the deceased is nearby in some unspecified location, although they are not seen or 
heard. I shall discuss such experiences in Sect.  4.3, highlighting how they can be 
understood in terms of affordances – perceptible opportunities for action.
These different types of non-veridical encounter with the dead are only fuzzily 
distinguished. There are grey areas regarding whether an experience of presence 
involves a sensory component or not, and whether a particularly radical misinter-
pretation of the external world constitutes a hallucination or merely a misperception. 
Dreams and imagination provide further complications that will not be addressed 
here. Nevertheless, these different kinds of non-veridical experience appear to have 
differing traits. For example, they seem to have different temporal trajectories. Grim-
by’s (1993) study of bereavement among the elderly reports that (what they refer to 
as) post-bereavement hallucinations decline considerably over the first year of the 
bereavement, whereas experiences of the presence of the deceased did not. There 
is also some research suggesting that ‘externalised’ expressions of one’s continu-
ing bonds with the dead – i.e., sensory illusions and hallucinations – are associated 
with violent death and feelings of responsibility for the bereavement, while ‘inter-
nalised’ expressions of continuing bonds (such as evoking an image of the deceased 
as a comforting presence) are positively associated with personal growth (Field & 
Filanosky, 2009).
5 See also Sacks (2012) for discussion and examples of bereavement hallucinations.
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3  Sensorimotor theory: expectations and disruption
According to the enactive sensorimotor approach, the phenomenology of per-
ceptual experience outstrips current sensory contact with the world. Thus, a 
core explanandum of the approach is what has been referred to as the problem 
of ‘perceptual presence’ (otherwise referred to as amodal completion) – our abil-
ity to perceive whole objects and scenes despite the limitations of our current 
sensory contact with the world. It is said to be through sensorimotor expecta-
tions – implicit expectations regarding the counterfactual sensory effects of one’s 
engagement with the world – that we are able to experience whole meaningful 
objects and detailed scenes. These expectations involve an understanding of how 
to access other parts of the objects through moving our own bodies or the objects 
in question. As we shall see in Sect.  4.1, this allows for an explanation of an 
important type of non-veridical experience, when our sensorimotor expectations 
go awry.
The approach is importantly action-oriented, generally endorsing the Gib-
sonian idea that we perceive ‘affordances’ – opportunities for action. For Noë 
(2004, p. 105), ‘To perceive is (among other things) to learn how the environ-
ment structures one’s possibilities for movement and so it is, thereby, to experi-
ence possibilities of movement and action afforded by the environment.’ One’s 
expectation-laden engagement with an object requires a grasp of at least some of 
the ways this object can be interacted with. Without this, one would not be able 
to form expectancies regarding the sensory upshots of different possible kinds of 
interaction. Objects are thus said to afford an exploratory profile, enabling the 
perception of whole, voluminous objects (see Roberts, 2009). It is natural for the 
sensorimotor theorist to further acknowledge that we perceive larger-scale oppor-
tunities for action, which helps explain how skilful perceivers can experience 
objects as meaningful, thereby enabling fluent engagement with them. For exam-
ple, seeing a chair as a chair plausibly requires not only a grasp of how to bring 
other parts of the chair into view, but also the perception of the chair as affording 
sitting.
The sensorimotor approach takes much of its support from examples of senso-
rimotor disruption and adaptation. For example, the sensorimotor approach pro-
vides an explanation of evidence regarding vision inverting or displacing gog-
gles (e.g., Hurley, 1998; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Hurley & Noë, 2003; Degenaar, 
2013; Ward, 2016). These goggles disrupt the usual sensorimotor contingencies 
involved in perception but users gradually adapt to novel patterns of sensorimo-
tor contingency, allowing their perceptual experience to revert to some kind of 
normality. While wearing vision displacing goggles, movement initially causes 
an array of confusing sensory effects and distortions (Kohler, 1962, 1964; Taylor, 
1962), and proprioceptive feelings of movement conflict with visual experience. 
Use of these goggles can cause strange and hard-to-pin-down phenomenologi-
cal upshots. Kohler describes subjects who feel they are in a ‘topsy-turvy world’ 
where objects appear rubbery and distorted and people seem ‘jellylike’ (1964, 
p. 64). Taylor (1962) reports that after some time wearing the goggles, in addition 
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to seeing an object in the reversed position, the subject begins to see a ghostly 
object in the correct location. Such cases highlight how sensorimotor disruption 
can lead to odd, anomalous sensory encounters, which as we shall see, occurs in 
cases of grief also.
Taking sensorimotor disruption to explain why certain distressing life experi-
ences result in unusual perceptual effects has a precedent in the literature surround-
ing sensorimotor theory. Ataria (2015) proposes such an approach can allow us to 
better understand the perceptual effects of trauma and others have argued that a sen-
sorimotor approach can aid our understanding of psychopathology more generally 
(Myin et al., 2015). Ataria’s account of post-traumatic stress highlights the ways that 
disruption of one’s practical know-how during trauma experiences, particularly in 
relation to the ‘freeze’ response, can affect and impair perceptual abilities. Accord-
ing to Ataria (2015), when one is in a state of freeze response, one’s practical capac-
ities are impaired and may even collapse entirely, which can explain why trauma 
can, in extreme cases, result in temporary blindness or deafness:
When the ability to predict based on a set of (implicit) sensorimotor laws 
declines, one’s ability to perceive may also be damaged. Indeed, when the 
sensorimotor loop weakens, the ability to predict is reduced; one’s practical 
knowledge becomes weaker and in radical cases may even collapse. (p. 147)
The next section argues that grief too involves disruption of our usual sen-
sorimotor skills. The loss of a loved one can result in disruption to sensorimotor 
engagement due to one’s expectations regarding the presence of the deceased being 
thwarted.
3.1  Post‑bereavement sensorimotor disruption
Grief involves disruption to almost every aspect of one’s life. Parkes (1988) argues 
that grief involves major alterations to one’s ‘assumptive world’ – one’s taken-for-
granted system of beliefs, which allows them to fluently act and plan. Attig (1996) 
makes the related claim that grief is a process of relearning one’s world, encom-
passing emotional, psychological, behavioural, spiritual and social, physical and 
biological elements. Maclaren (2011, p. 62) tells us that the ‘genuine passion’ of 
grief ‘consists in a breakdown of our habitual negotiation of the world’. Ratcliffe 
(2017) similarly takes grief to be characterised by a rupture to ‘wide-ranging system 
of habitual expectations and practical meanings’ (p. 166). Here I focus on disrup-
tion to perceptual skills and how this results in anomalous perceptual experiences 
(although, as we shall see in Sect.  5, these capacities are intimately connected to 
broader aspects of lived experience). I argue that the loss of a loved one can result in 
significant violations of one’s sensorimotor expectations, thus offering an explana-
tion of the non-veridical and confusing perceptual experiences that often occur fol-
lowing a bereavement.
The sensorimotor approach does a good job of explaining various types of per-
ceptual distortion and anomalous perceptual experiences in terms of sensorimotor 
disruption. A key way that sensorimotor disruption can occur for the bereaved is 
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through the violation of one’s implicit expectations related to seeing, hearing, touch-
ing and otherwise engaging with a person who has died. An initial way in which 
post-bereavement disruption of this sort can be evidenced is through research show-
ing that early stages of mourning are characterised by ‘search’ efforts to recover 
the deceased (Parkes, 1970, 1996; Bowlby, 1980), indicating that in some sense the 
bereaved ‘expect’ the deceased to show up. In a wide range of contexts, bereaved 
subjects have sensorimotor expectations specific to their deceased loved one, and 
this shows up in such search activities, from scanning the environment for any 
sign of the deceased to reaching out for one’s deceased spouse while lying in bed. 
The violation of the expected sensory upshots of one’s search efforts constitutes a 
kind of sensorimotor disruption, which can plausibly have the kinds of perceptual 
upshots to be discussed in Sect. 4. The absence of the deceased can disrupt one’s 
expectation-laden sensorimotor engagement to such an extent that empirical work 
has found likenesses between bereavement and sensory deprivation. Hofer (1984) 
finds that the ‘loss of customary environmental stimulation’ associated with sensory 
deprivation ‘seems to reproduce several of the cardinal symptoms of the bereaved’ 
(p. 189). Both grief and sensory deprivation can produce perceptual distortions, as 
well as disruption to our overall mental and physical functioning. Hofer claims we 
are dependent on the patterns and levels of sensory stimulation in regulating our 
mental and physical functioning. When such levels are not sufficient or the patterns 
of stimulation are radically changed, this can result in impairments of our capacities.
[W]e notice that our concentration and attention are impaired, our percep-
tion is somewhat distorted, we do not sleep well, our appetite is reduced or 
subject to sudden cravings, and we are periodically overcome with fatigue. In 
its extreme form, we feel that we are falling apart mentally. We see and hear 
things that are not there. (p. 191)
Although according to Hofer, bereavement does not involve the level of sensory 
change that sensory deprivation does, where one person is of particularly great 
importance to another, ‘the loss of this one source may actually constitute a mas-
sive deprivation of relevant environmental input’ (p. 189).6 Certain patterns of envi-
ronmental stimulation may be crucial for one’s functioning, and these patterns may 
involve a specific other person.
Although sensorimotor expectations are often appealed to in explanations of the 
perception of straightforward objects, such as tomatoes with hidden backs, they are 
also used by sensorimotor theorists in accounting for more complex perceptual phe-
nomena. For example, Noë (2006) highlights that such expectations might allow 
for the experience of experimental music as something other than ‘mere noise’ (p. 
31). One must have a degree of understanding of how the melody will unfold for 
the music to make sense. Thus, sensorimotor expectations are taken to be interwo-
ven and continuous with one’s broader understanding of, and expectations about, 
the world. Against such a backdrop, it is reasonable to allow for one’s sensorimotor 
6 See also Guenther (2013) for further discussion of the links between sensory deprivation and social 
deprivation.
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expectations to also relate to specific individuals. One may have expectations that 
moving towards the kitchen will bring a loved one into view or that further investi-
gation of a creaking sound would reveal it to be the sound of a loved one’s footsteps.
Because of the continuity between sensorimotor expectations and one’s broader 
understanding of the world, the line between perception and judgment is somewhat 
blurred, and so the line between perceptual illusions and false judgements is likely 
to be somewhat blurred too.7 However, the sensorimotor theorist is likely to reject 
the attribution of experiences like hearing a sound as a loved one’s footsteps to 
merely post-perceptual judgment rather than to perception itself. Such experiences 
are taken to involve the immediate perception of action opportunities or affordances. 
The affordances presented by an experience as of a loved one’s footsteps will differ 
from those presented by an experience as of a creak. To the extent that affordances 
are understood as aspects of perceptual experience, an experience as of a loved one’s 
footsteps, will be importantly perceptual too.
The blurred line between sensorimotor expectations and more explicit types of 
expectation and thought should not be taken to imply that they are inseparable. 
Despite this continuity and the fact that sensorimotor expectations are intended to 
allow for meaningful perception of potentially complex phenomena, sensorimotor 
expectations are themselves generally taken to be implicit and practical. The term 
‘expectation’ might be suggestive of propositional or explicit thought, but as Myin, 
O’Regan, & Myin-Germeys note:
There is no logical need for this, as an expectation can exist as a sensitivity or 
adaptation to a particular context. An animal can be on alert when nearing a 
particular place because, based on its own history, it expects the presence of 
another animal at that place. But nothing logically requires that such sensitiv-
ity should only be explicable by a content-carrying inner episode, let alone one 
involving a proposition. (2015, p. 362)
Thus, sensorimotor expectations are generally taken to be a kind of implicit, non-
propositional know-how. If this is the case, one’s sensorimotor expectations can 
come apart from one’s explicit judgements. For example, one may know that their 
loved one has died, and yet still in some sense expect the deceased to be present, as 
indicated by, for example, ‘search’ behaviours (Parkes, 1996). One’s implicit expec-
tations relating to the deceased – despite explicit judgements that the person has 
died – can shape their perceptual encounters with the world.
The claim that bereavement involves the violation of sensorimotor expectations 
relates to complementary research highlighting the important ways in which one is 
habituated towards the presence of others (e.g., Fuchs, 2018; Køster, 2020, 2021; 
Ratcliffe, 2020a, 2020b) and the role that this plays in bereavement phenomenology. 
Køster (2020, 2021) outlines how one’s bodily memories of the deceased play a role 
in the sensing the continued presence of the deceased. These embodied memories, 
7 See Noë (2009) for discussion of the continuity of perception and thought within his version of the 
sensorimotor approach. Thought is taken to be another means of access to the world, and the approach 
permits of borderline cases between thought and straightforwardly perceptual access.
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he claims, involve one’s habituation towards the ‘felt sense of the concrete other’ 
and encompass auditory, olfactory and gustatory, visual, tactile, and kinaesthetic 
elements. He argues it is through this habituation that people are able to experience 
‘continuing bonds’ with the dead. Fuchs relatedly states, ‘This felt presence is the 
result of an accumulated history of encounters and interactions with the loved one 
that has left its traces in one’s lived body and lived space’ (2018, p. 47). The senso-
rimotor theorist can concur with such claims about how we become attuned to the 
presence of another. With this approach, such habituation can be construed as ele-
ments of our sensorimotor skills – we have expectations regarding our possibilities 
for interacting with another person and the sensory upshots of this interaction.
4  Non‑veridical bereavement experiences within a sensorimotor 
framework
We have seen there is good reason to think that bereavement involves sensorimo-
tor disruption. However, I have not yet addressed in detail the phenomenological 
implications of such a disruption and whether they can account for reported non-
veridical post-bereavement experiences. Here I shall outline how the three types of 
non-veridical bereavement phenomena that were roughly distinguished in Sect.  2 
can be explained by disruption to sensorimotor skills. As we shall see, the enactive 
sensorimotor approach can provide an account of post-bereavement illusions and 
hallucinations that is illuminating and faithful to the phenomenology of these non-
veridical experiences. It will become clear that different facets of the approach can 
explain different types of non-veridical bereavement experience.
4.1  Atypical amodal completion and misperception
As noted in Sect. 3, sensorimotor enactivism can explain aspects of perception that 
would – under certain common assumptions about perceptual experience – be puz-
zling. One such feature of perceptual experience is the ability to perceive whole 
objects and scenes despite limitations of sensory contact with the world, i.e., the puz-
zle of perceptual presence or amodal completion. That the sensorimotor approach 
dissolves this puzzle is taken to be one of its key virtues, and although there are 
many other possible explanations of the phenomenon of perceptual presence or 
amodal completion, Noë (2002, 2004) argues that only the enactive sensorimotor 
account is accurate with regards the associated phenomenology. One’s perceptions 
of whole objects and detailed scenes involve a tension that is evident upon phenom-
enological reflection: they involve both an experience associated with a limited sen-
sory perspective (i.e., in one sense, we only see the facing side of the tomato) but, in 
another sense, we experience the whole. For the sensorimotor theorist, this tension 
is explained by our tacit expectations about how movements of one’s body (or of the 
object in question) would allow sensory access to further aspects of the object, giv-
ing rise to the experience of the whole or ‘gestalt’. One’s experience of the presence 
of wholes is thus said to be ‘virtual’ (Noë, 2004, pp. 49–52) in that it is based upon 
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our understanding of how to access the hidden parts. This solution is taken to reflect 
the phenomenology of our experiences (thereby providing evidence for the theory) 
and render them unpuzzling. It is said that upon close phenomenological reflection, 
perceptual experience is precisely as the sensorimotor account describes: we per-
ceive a world that is available to us in all its detail, rather than it seeming as though 
we have immediate awareness of all this detail.
The way the sensorimotor approach allows the dissolution of the puzzle of per-
ceptual presence also has the advantage of offering a phenomenologically plausible 
explanation of important types of non-veridical experience, further highlighting the 
approach’s explanatory value. The approach, I argue, renders both amodal comple-
tion and consequent misperceptions unpuzzling, and is particularly well-suited to 
explaining a very common type of post-bereavement misperception.
Where sensorimotor expectations are violated, the experience of the whole (i.e., 
three-dimensional objects and detailed scenes) may be atypical or non-veridical. 
Because perception is taken to be underdetermined by current sensory underpin-
nings, and particularly where there is not much temporally extended exploration 
of the environment, there is scope for us to perceive objects in atypical ways. For 
example, where we take ourselves to experience a whole voluminous tomato, but 
in fact it is a tomato façade, our sensorimotor expectations have been breached in 
some sense (Hurley & Noë, 2006). And the experience as of a whole tomato is non-
veridical. Reaching over to grasp the tomato but being met with only a façade is 
likely to correct this non-veridical experience and will also likely give to a some-
what disconcerting experience of the absence of the expected spherical object. In 
such cases, upon reflection we can notice that important details (such as the back 
of the tomato) were in fact lacking in our immediate sensory awareness. Although 
there is a sense in which we perceive the whole, we can also notice the other impor-
tant sense in which we do not perceive the hidden elements of objects and scenes in 
all their detail. Thus, although one may find their misinterpretation of an object or 
scene surprising, the surprise is not due to those features with which one has imme-
diate sensory contact being experienced non-veridically. Rather, it is one’s sensori-
motor expectations about how to access further details that have gone awry.
Grief can result in non-veridical and atypical interpretations of objects and scenes 
in a way that accords with one’s tacit expectations,8 and again this is manifest upon 
phenomenological reflection. This account of misperceptions is especially well-
suited to explain common short-lived non-veridical experiences associated with 
grief. An extremely prevalent type of post-bereavement experience is that of mis-
perceiving a stranger in a crowd as being the deceased (Clayton, 2000, p. 306). For 
a moment, the bereaved recognises this person as being their loved one, and yet with 
closer attention, it becomes clear that it is a stranger with only a passing resem-
blance to the person who died. By bringing the details of a person’s face into view, 
the misperception is corrected. One may experience a disconcerting clash between 
8 As discussed in Sect.  3.1, one piece of evidence for such expectations being a prevalent feature of 




the previously experienced whole – the apparent face of a loved one, as experienced 
on the basis of tacit expectations – and the reality. More generally, when peering 
into a crowd, although it may seem, in one sense, to be a richly detailed experience, 
again we can attend to sense in which the sensory detail is lacking. It is the fact that 
we usually simply attend to the ‘whole’, without paying close attention the limita-
tions of our sensory perspective, that allows for this variety of misperception.
While there are undoubtedly alternative explanations of such misperceptions, the 
sensorimotor approach is well equipped to explain these experiences in a way that 
captures their phenomenology. As Noë says of the more general experience of see-
ing people in a crowd, ‘Of course, it is not the case that you actually see everyone in 
sharp focus and uniform detail from the centre out to the periphery. We know that 
is not true. It does not seem as if it is true’ (2009, p. 472). Likewise, in the case at 
hand, the experience of the face in the crowd does not present itself as being one in 
which one attends to the details of the face but experiences these details non-verid-
ically. Rather, the experience seems to be both more momentary and more nebu-
lous than would be suggested by such an explanation. When one does attend to the 
details of the face, the misperception is eliminated, which coheres with the claim 
that the error lies in the way the scene – and the face of the person, more specifically 
– is perceived without immediate sensory awareness of the details.
As discussed, sensorimotor expectations are activated against the backdrop of 
other expectations and judgements (e.g., Hurley & Noë, 2006, p. 17), and they are 
also likely to be influenced by one’s relations to others, desires, thought patterns 
and current emotional state (see also Sect.  5 below). A loved one can be deeply 
entrenched in one’s world and their absence can extremely destabilising, and within 
such a context, sensorimotor expectations relating to the presence of the deceased 
are likely. As noted above, the non-veridical experience of seeing the deceased will 
also give rise to different affordances. The bereaved may be momentarily primed 
to approach the person, speak to them, etc., which will likely clash in a jarring way 
with one’s explicit knowledge of the loved one’s death. Through more protracted 
engagement with the world, one’s perceptual experience ceases to suggest that the 
face is that of the deceased, which may give way to painful feelings of absence 
rather than presence.
Other non-veridical experiences associated with bereavement do not appear to be 
misperceptions of this sort and may instead be classified as full-blown hallucina-
tions. It is to such experiences that we now turn.
4.2  ‘Appearances’ without reality and bereavement hallucinations
Not all post-bereavement non-veridical experiences can be attributed to an atypical 
interpretation of a stimulus. Some subjects describe hallucinatory experiences that 
do not seem to map onto anything that is really there in their environment. These 
might be explained through the experience of non-veridical ‘appearances’ (associ-
ated with one’s immediate sensory perspective), which are not integrated within 
the usual patterns of sensorimotor dependency. This may account for unusual sen-
sory appearances that can occur while wearing vision disrupting goggles. Such 
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experiences may also occur as a result of the sensorimotor disruption characteristic 
of bereavement. Although the sensorimotor account says little about why one might 
experience hallucinatory appearances in the first place,9 appealing to the notion of 
sensorimotor expectations does allow for an explanation of the distinctive character 
of a puzzling subset of non-veridical bereavement experiences. In particular, it can 
tell us why such experiences often lack ‘perceptual presence’.
Understanding the perception of objects and scenes in terms of the sensory 
effects of one’s own movement allows for a distinction between experiences of 
mind-independent whole objects and transient sensory changes or ‘appearances’ that 
occur as we move (e.g., see Noë, 2004, Chapter 3). As highlighted above, at least 
some of the time we can attend to our changing sensory perspectives, giving rise to 
a kind of duality to perceptual experience. One might notice, for example, the ellip-
tical appearance of a plate when viewed from an angle or the fact that the volume 
of music appears quieter when the radio is further away. The sensorimotor approach 
can also thus allow for instances in which we experience (non-veridical) appear-
ances, which are not situated within the usual patterns of sensorimotor contingency, 
making them lack objective import. Noë points out that experiences can be non-
veridical along either the ‘perspectival’ (i.e., relating to one’s sensory perspective) 
or ‘factual’ dimensions (relating to the ‘gestalt’ or whole). Atypical amodal com-
pletion allows for the latter type of experience, but other atypical experiences con-
form to the former, relating to appearances that are not properly integrated within 
one’s sensorimotor attunement to the world. Where appearances are non-veridical, 
the perceiver may experience rogue sensations that lack the ‘perceptual presence’ 
characteristic of objective perception.
An example of this kind of experience is an after-image. After-images are expe-
rienced as overlaid on the visual field rather than as whole, perceptually present 
objects. These images appear to the agent in whatever direction they look, rather 
than allowing for changing sensory inputs as one engages with the world.10 Fuchs 
endorses a similar idea with regards hallucinatory experiences, stating:
[F]rom an enactive point of view, hallucinations are only pseudo-perceptions 
which lack the sensorimotor cycles necessary for realistic perceiving on the 
first level. They may thus be regarded as products of the prefiguring activity 
of sensory or other brain systems which are projected into the field of aware-
ness without resulting in sensorimotor interactions or perspectival change (this 
10 Relatedly, Ward (2012) uses such an approach to highlight why synaesthetic colour experiences do 
not adapt away as one might expect. With this approach, synaesthetic colour experiences are mere colour 
‘appearances’, detached from the usual systematic sensorimotor patterns through which objective colours 
are experienced. Sensorimotor understanding regarding such regularities is not exercised in the synaes-
thesia case, and thus the experience does not present itself as being of ‘real’ colours. This is vindicated 
by the fact that synaesthetic colour experiences do not – as one may expect – get in the way of one’s abil-
ity to perceive the actual colours of objects.
9 See Seth (2014) for discussion of the possible mechanistic underpinnings of these kinds of experi-
ences. He suggests synaesthesia (and plausibly the types of hallucinations under discussion) are explica-
ble within a predictive processing model of the sensorimotor approach in terms of the brain’s predictive 
model lacking counterfactual richness.
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is why they are frequently experienced by the patients as “not really percep-
tions”). In other words, hallucinations are the result of a decoupling of brain 
activity and normal body-environment feedback. (2020, p. 66)
Hallucinations, with this approach, often lack the perceptual presence fostered 
through one’s grasp of how movement will induce perspectival changes.11 Such an 
approach could help to explain the nature of phantom smells, sights and sounds that 
occur following bereavement that cannot be attributed to any external stimulus. In 
such cases, we should expect the experience not to present itself as a part of an inte-
grated scene in the way that the amodal completion cases above do. At least some 
reported bereavement hallucinations have the hallmarks of this kind of experience, 
and such experiences may seem especially puzzling. Consider the following case 
described by Schneck (1989), as cited by Sacks (2012):
A reporter brought the unexpected news one morning and Mitchell, greatly 
shaken, went up to tell his wife. On the way back downstairs he had an odd 
experience: he could see the face of Brooks, larger than life, smiling, and very 
distinct, yet looking as if it were made of dewy gossamer. When he looked 
down, the vision disappeared, but for ten days he could see it a little above his 
head to the left. (p. 136)
The described hallucinated face in this example would not allow for sensorimotor 
investigation because it lingers at the same point in the visual field no matter how 
the perceiver moves. The hallucinated appearance more closely resembles an after-
image than a genuine object, lacking perceptual presence and appearing like ‘dewy 
gossamer’ rather than an integrated aspect of the environment. Paying attention to 
the role of sensorimotor expectations allows for an explanation of this strange type 
of bereavement hallucination.
4.3  Alterations to perceived affordances and quasi‑sensory experiences 
of presence
As discussed, the ways perception and action are entwined also encompass the fact 
that perception is generally action oriented. The sensorimotor approach draws upon 
the notion of ‘affordances’ – perceptible opportunities for action – from Gibson’s 
ecological theory of perception (1979). Noë suggests that all objects of perception 
are, in some sense, affordances because all perception requires an attunement to the 
ways that our own actions can bring other parts of the world into view (2004, p. 
106; 2015). He argues, ‘What we are given, always, is an opportunity or affordance 
for further effort, engagement, negotiation, and skilful transaction’ (2015, p. 14; see 
also Roberts, 2009). Beyond the sensorimotor profiles of objects, we also perceive 
them as affording a suite of larger scale intentional actions. We not only perceive 
the tomato as a whole, voluminous object, but also as an object that affords eating. 
11 I shall not here address the question of whether one can ever have a hallucinatory experience that fully 
resembles veridical object perception, involving a sense of perceptual presence.
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As Di Paolo (2016, p. 230) points out, ‘I don’t normally inspect a bottle with my 
fingers to perceive in it a Gestalt shape as opposed to disjointed sensations; I pour 
some beer out of it. I don’t regard the red tomato and consider its unseen sides and 
its voluminous presence; I cut it and add it to the salad’. The opportunities for action 
presented by the tomato structure our experience of it, and the action-oriented nature 
of perception allows us to competently interact with the environment.
Grief alters the opportunities for action that one experiences, and this is espe-
cially helpful in explaining quasi-sensory experiences of presence, which may 
involve no particular sense modality. At times, non-veridical bereavement experi-
ences may be understood not in terms of atypical perceptual organisation (and thus 
is not to be explained in terms of atypical amodal completion or the experience of 
sensory appearances that are not properly integrated into the usual patterns of sen-
sorimotor continency to which one is attuned) but rather in terms of atypical percep-
tion of affordances. For example, if one perceives the possessions of the deceased 
as affording possibilities for action, like laying them out for the deceased (as though 
she was still there to make use of them), or perceives a grave as affording the oppor-
tunity to converse, then the bereaved may report an experience of the presence of 
the deceased. It is important to note also that these alterations to experienced affor-
dances can vary wildly depending upon the culture within which one is situated. For 
example, in Hong Kong it is common for the bereaved to report experiences of their 
loved one returning the form of an insect, allowing them the opportunity to speak 
to the deceased once more (Chan, et al., 2005). Drawing upon the notion of affor-
dances, we can take the insect to afford conversing and respectful interaction, rather 
than, say, swatting away.
Ratcliffe (2020b) provides a detailed account of how alterations to the possibili-
ties we experience in our environments can give rise to the some of the unusual 
experiences characteristic of grief. He highlights how these possibilities may result 
in an experience of the presence of the deceased:
Consider how one’s home might be experienced in ways that implicate a part-
ner: the sofa appears as something for us to sit on; these are the films we enjoy 
watching together; this is our bed. The suggestion is that, when the partner 
dies, a habitual world may remain largely intact for a time, despite an explicit, 
propositional recognition of the death. Things still appear as they did before 
and therefore imply the partner’s potential or actual presence, in a diffuse, non-
localized way that cannot be attributed to a more specific inventory of per-
ceived properties. (p. 6)
Ratcliffe states that these possibilities may not be perceptual in nature. However, 
it does seem that at least some such possibilities can be construed in terms of the 
affordances offered by the perceptual landscape, thus allowing for further way of 
understanding grief’s impact on perceptual experience. Grief results in alterations 
to the affordances that are salient to us as perceivers. Objects which previously gave 
rise to certain opportunities for intersubjective engagement, or which are strongly 
associated with the deceased, may no longer solicit the kinds of actions that they 
once did or conversely may continue to afford actions in ways that implicate the 
partner’s presence (see also Sect. 5).
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One may find while grieving that activities lack their usual motivational appeal, 
where one feels numb emotionally (Roberts, 2019), or the world appears strangely 
lacking in opportunity (Ratcliffe, 2020b). According to Lindemann’s (1963) research 
into acute grief, one may go through the motions of their daily routines, ‘but these 
activities do not proceed in the automatic, self-sustaining fashion which character-
izes normal work but have to be carried on with effort, as though each fragment 
of the activity became a special task. The bereaved is surprised to find how large 
a part of his customary activity was done in some meaningful relationship to the 
deceased and has now lost its significance’ (p. 10). Our perceptions of the world 
are action-oriented and the possibilities for action that we experience are altered by 
bereavement. As we shall see in greater detail in the next section, consideration of 
affordances and how they relate to emotion and intersubjective relations with others, 
can serve to plug certain important omissions in the sensorimotor approach.
5  Limitations of the sensorimotor approach
We have seen that the sensorimotor approach has the resources to provide a plausi-
ble account of various puzzling types of post-bereavement perceptual phenomenol-
ogy. However, grief is more bewildering, world-shattering, and painful than would 
be suggested by the comparison with other types of sensorimotor disruption, such as 
that induced by vision reversing goggles.
As it stands, the central resources of the sensorimotor approach do not provide a 
fleshed out explanation of why the loss of a significant person, but not the loss of an 
object like a car or a computer, should so frequently induce the kinds of anomalous 
experienced discussed in the preceding sections. Nor does it highlight other impor-
tant differences between the sensorimotor disruption caused by bereavement and 
that exemplified by vision reversing goggles or by mundane cases of violated senso-
rimotor expectations, such as those caused by one’s office being reorganised in one’s 
absence. Part of the reason that anomalous post-bereavement perceptual experiences 
seem so importantly different from experiences involving more mundane violated 
sensorimotor expectations is that perceptual experience is closely intertwined with 
affect and intersubjectivity. The sensorimotor approach has been criticised in detail 
elsewhere for its silence regarding these aspects of experience (e.g., Bower & Gal-
lagher, 2013; Gallagher & Bower, 2014), and non-veridical bereavement experi-
ences provide a further illuminating case where perceptual phenomenology (the tar-
get explanandum of the sensorimotor theory) cannot be wholly divorced from the 
affective and the intersubjective. In this section, I provide an initial sketch of some 
natural avenues through which the sensorimotor approach can be supplemented to 
provide a richer account of post-bereavement perceptual phenomenology.
The shattering of expectations regarding the presence of a loved one is much 
more emotionally charged than most other instances of sensorimotor disruption. 
Although the sensorimotor approach does not focus upon affect and emotion, 
bereavement’s emotional significance does have clear implications from a senso-
rimotor perspective. In particular, one’s affective state is tied both to how one in 
fact interacts with the world, and the counterfactual opportunities for action one 
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perceives as available to them. As one example, Lindemann (1963, p. 9) notes that 
when grief-stricken, one is likely to feel weak and fatigued, so the slightest effort is 
exhausting. Grief is then likely to have a profound effect on one’s embodied interac-
tion with the world; one’s perceptual engagement itself become slower and feel more 
effortful than usual. A bereaved subject’s perceptual experience may be coloured by 
how laborious it feels to read words on a page or to eat some food. Even the scope of 
one’s attention is influenced by affective valence (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). The 
opportunities for action that are experienced as salient – and become solicitations 
(Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014) – depend upon one’s concerns, emotions and one’s 
relations with others. For a grieving subject, opportunities that would normally be 
enticing (eating a piece of chocolate cake, gazing at a beautiful sunset, etc.) may no 
longer have the same affective appeal, particularly where those activities would have 
previously been shared with the person who died.12 As Maclaren puts it, ‘In grief 
like this, things within one’s perceptual field no longer clearly call to one to do this 
or to say that’ (2011, p. 62). As discussed in Sect. 4.3, on the flip side of this, other 
opportunities that would not normally solicit action may be experienced as salient 
while grieving; a grave or an insect might solicit conversation, when ordinarily they 
would not.
A further way in which bereavement’s disruption is distinctive is that, as research-
ers have highlighted elsewhere, the intelligibility of one’s projects, activities and 
routines can hinge upon another person so that when that person dies, these ways of 
engaging with the world cease to make sense altogether (e.g., Maclaren, 2011; Rat-
cliffe, 2020a).13 For example, as Ratcliffe (2020a, p. 659) highlights, one’s activities 
and projects may be for the other person, thus ceasing to be comprehensible if that 
person dies. Ratcliffe notes that they may also be for ‘us’ and relate to things ‘we’ 
do together, and this ‘we’ may be irreducible to a ‘you’ and an ‘I’, so these activi-
ties likewise become unintelligible when the other person has died (ibid.). Maclaren 
relatedly says that for a person who is grieving the loss of someone central to their 
world, ‘Not only his big life projects, but even his everyday routines had her as a 
condition of their meaningfulness’ (p. 60). With such an approach, the loss of a per-
son can thereby impair one’s ability to meaningfully interact with the world in a way 
that cases of thwarted expectations due to a reorganised office does not. This goes 
some way towards explaining why anomalous post-bereavement phenomenology is 
a frequent occurrence, while other changes and absences rarely have such a strik-
ing impact upon our sensorimotor skills. Our ability to interact with the world in 
the meaningful and fluent ways can depend in important respects upon our relations 
with others, and thereby may be impaired through a bereavement.14
14 Another way in which a specific person’s absence might profoundly disrupt one’s sensorimotor 
engagement is through the dissolution of joint navigation of the world. Where a loved one dies, any 
collective worldly engagement with them ceases. Chemero (2016) introduces the notion of ‘sensorimo-
12 See De Haan, et  al. (2013) for a helpful characterisation of the affective allure of affordances as a 
key dimension of the ‘field’ of affordances – ‘the relevant possibilities for action that a particular  indi-
vidual is responsive to in a concrete situation’ (p. 7, italics in original).
13 See also Guenther’s (2013) account of how the devastating effects of social isolation expose how 




Relatedly, bereavement can impact the opportunities presented to us for regulat-
ing our own affective lives (Krueger & Colombetti, 2018). A favourite song or relax-
ing bath might afford opportunities for altering and improving one’s emotional state, 
for example, and likewise other people also present opportunities for shaping our 
emotional lives. For example, when faced with a threat, holding one’s partner’s hand 
can attenuate the activation of the neural systems involved in threat responses (Coan 
et al., 2006). Through a bereavement, a person that may have played a key part in 
regulating our emotional lives is no longer available (e.g., see Ratcliffe & Byrne, 
2021). This can make violated expectations relating the presence of the loved one 
especially disorienting, again shaping one’s interactions with the world, and poten-
tially further impairing one’s sensorimotor skills.
This section has highlighted some avenues for supplementing the sensorimotor 
approach, so that it can tell a more fleshed out story post-bereavement perceptual 
phenomenology. Any sensorimotor disruption characteristic of grief will involve a 
crucial emotional component and bereavement may violently disrupt one’s ability to 
engage in meaningful worldly interaction due to the ways in which this ability can 
hinge upon one’s relations with others. A full account of the non-veridical experi-
ences that can follow bereavement would require a more in-depth exploration of the 
role of intersubjective and affective factors in perceptual experience, so the discus-
sion here should be read as simply one key building block towards such an account.
6  Adapting to a new world
This paper has argued that consideration of sensorimotor expectations and the 
action-oriented nature of perception allows for a phenomenologically accurate 
(although in certain respects, incomplete) account of post-bereavement non-verid-
ical experiences. One’s sensorimotor expectations are thwarted by the permanent 
absence of a loved one and perceived affordances are altered, which helps to explain 
the three key types of post-bereavement non-veridical experience. With other kinds 
of sensorimotor disruption, however, such as reversing goggles and sensory sub-
stitution, there is usually a comparatively speedy adaptation to the new patterns of 
sensorimotor contingency, occurring over several weeks of use (e.g., Kohler, 1962). 
Bereavement hallucinations and experiences of presence, on the other hand, seem 
to be more persistent. This is likely partly due to the crucial role played by our 
Footnote 14 (continued)
tor empathy’ – a kind of skilful perceptual and motor coordination with objects and with other people 
through which ‘your lived body expands, and temporarily includes aspects of the non-bodily environ-
ment, whether they are tools or other humans’ (p. 145). Just as a blind person might form a synergy with 
their cane, which allows them to perceive the world at the cane’s tip rather than the cane in their hand, 
one might also form a system with another person through collective worldly engagement. In such cases, 
Chemero argues, people can (temporarily) form a coordinated and unified system. Such synergies seem 
especially plausible among, say, partners who share their lives. If this is the case, bereavement may result 
in the added disruption of breaking apart a unified system comprising the partners, further hindering 
one’s sensorimotor abilities. Although further discussion of this aspect of sensorimotor impairment and 
bereavement is beyond the scope of the current paper, it presents an avenue for further research.
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intersubjective relations with others in our meaningful worldly interactions, as out-
lined in the previous section.
Recall that, as noted in Sect. 2, Grimby (1993) found that post-bereavement ‘hal-
lucinations’ among the elderly decline significantly over the first year of the bereave-
ment, which would be indicative of adaptation to our sensorimotor expectations, 
while experiences of the presence of the deceased did not. Others note that people 
continue to report sense of presence experiences may years after the loss (e.g., Stef-
fen & Coyle, 2011). This may suggest that while certain sensorimotor expectations 
regarding the dead are likely to adapt over the first year of bereavement, others can 
persist much longer. Adaptation to sensorimotor contingencies occurs in stages and 
may only be partial.15
This may have implications for frameworks for understanding grief. The continu-
ing bonds approach to bereavement tell us that rather than grief being characterised 
by the severing of one’s relationship with their loved one, it instead involves adapta-
tion of this relationship. Recent work has emphasised post-bereavement non-verid-
ical experiences as manifestations of one’s ‘continuing bonds’ with the deceased 
(e.g., Klass et al., 1996; Steffen & Coyle, 2011, 2017). Køster (2020) argues that the 
continuation of bonds with the dead relies upon an ‘adequately sedimented’ sense of 
the deceased in one’s bodily memory. The sensorimotor theorist can endorse such a 
claim, but it is worth adding that, since sensorimotor adaptation can occur in stages 
at different rates, there may be several different types of connection we retain with 
the dead. Some continued connections are short-lived, and others can persist indefi-
nitely. One type of continued relationship with the deceased can be understood in 
terms of one’s continued sensorimotor expectations regarding the deceased, induc-
ing non-veridical experiences. Atypical amodal completion, for example, seems to 
occur most frequently in the acute stages of grief. After those sensorimotor expec-
tations have adapted to the absence of the dead, however, the altered perception 
of affordances, which may implicate the deceased in some non- or quasi-sensory 
manner (see Ratcliffe, 2020b), may persist. Other types of worldly engagement may 
involve the development of new relationships, perhaps with the memories and a (re)
constructed image of the deceased, which might constitute further varieties of con-
tinuing bonds.
There is generally a gradual adaptation to loss in bereavement. As Parkes (1988, 
p. 56) says of spousal bereavement, ‘Habits of action [...] and thought [...] must be 
revised if the survivor is to live as a widow’. Attig, who argues that grief can be 
understood a process of relearning the world, states, “[F]inding our way in the world 
after bereavement, that is, relearning the world, is not a matter of learning informa-
tion about the world but learning how to be and act in the world differently in the 
light of our loss” (p. 107). We eventually learn how to fluently act in the world again. 
But grieving is a protracted process because, ‘When we grieve, we must relearn vir-
tually every object, place, event, relationships with others, and aspects of ourselves 
15 In discussion of vision inverting goggles, O’Regan & Noë note that adaptation can occur in stages: 
bodily skills like grasping objects may be re-mastered and these objects may appear ‘normal’, while writ-
ing might still appear reversed and unreadable (2001, p. 953).
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that the lives of those who have died have touched’ (p. 122). Thus, fully adapting to 
the new patterns of sensorimotor dependency following a bereavement is likely to be 
a slow and difficult process.
Consideration of sensorimotor expectations and the circumstances under which 
these expectations go awry may allow for research into further types of atypical and 
non-veridical perceptual phenomena. The approach set out here may thus have appli-
cability beyond the exploration of post-bereavement experiences. For now, though, 
it suffices to note that the sensorimotor account can capture and elucidate some of 
the most confusing and under-researched elements of bereavement phenomenology, 
which is, I hope, indicative of the approach’s explanatory value.
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